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personalities in each station changed, 
sometimes more than once, over the five 
years under review. Yet with the start 
of each successive chapter Still takes us 
back in time through many of the earlier 
incumbents’ thinking and interactions, 
albeit from a different angle. This makes 
everything hard to follow, to the point 
where I found myself crying out for a 
chart depicting who relieved whom in 
each of the key naval positions over the 
years in question. Therefore, a good 
prior working knowledge of the key 
naval personalities of the 1920s and 
where and when they served would 
enhance the reader’s experience greatly.
Similarly, when it came to the geograph-
ic regions depicted in chapter 4 and be-
yond, it would have been useful to have 
included a map of some sort in each 
chapter, depicting each of the key places 
mentioned in the text. This would have 
allowed the reader to tie things together 
in terms of time and space and to ap-
preciate better the enormous challenges 
posed by the shortages of platforms and 
the multiplicity of taskings. Although I 
am of European descent and spent most 
of my naval career in these waters, I 
was forced on many occasions to resort 
to online maps to appreciate better 
the author’s points—something that 
perhaps should not have been necessary.
Finally, it also might have been worth 
including a little more detail on what 
became known as the “Naval Battle of 
Paris” in the first chapter. After all, the 
U.S. decision to build a “navy second to 
none”—and the obvious impact this was 
going to have on a close ally, Great Brit-
ain—constituted a monumental policy 
decision for the United States, with 
ramifications to the present day. Such an 
enhanced discussion would have been 
of abiding interest to most naval officers 
and the readership of this journal.
These comments notwithstanding, this 
book still is a very worthwhile addition 
to the library of anyone with a passing 
interest in the development of U.S. naval 
policy. It covers a rarely addressed and 
largely unsung part of naval responsibili-
ties: providing naval support to foreign 
policy in its widest sense; this makes it 
valuable in and of itself. Even though 
general readers may get a little lost in the 
minutiae, Still’s attention to detail and 
his intimate knowledge of the key naval 
personalities of the era give the book a 
wide application within the academic 
field, particularly for established naval 
historians of the period. The eighty-odd 
pages of endnotes alone are a rich source 
of material that can inspire any number 
of supporting studies and additional 
work. Finally, it should not be over-
looked that this glimpse into how the 
U.S. Navy responded in a previous era 
of great-power maneuvering could have 
renewed relevance in today’s uncertain 
times vis-à-vis China and Russia.
ANGUS ROSS
Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges 
for the United States, by Mara E. Karlin. Phila-
delphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2018. 296 
pages. $79.95.
Building Militaries in Fragile States is 
a classic example of a doctoral dis-
sertation transformed into a book. The 
author seeks to find the reason that 
U.S. efforts to create strong militaries 
in weaker countries are successful—or 
not. Her answer highlights the role of 
external actors, as well as the degree 
to which the host nation is willing to 
allow the United States to get involved 
in deep and sensitive matters of state 
(e.g., the assignment of personnel, 
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the creation of national strategy). The 
author details these conclusions in the 
book’s first three pages. The majority of 
the rest of the book is a tour of care-
fully selected cases, each adding to the 
evidence supporting Karlin’s conclusion.
This journey includes transit through 
an academically obligatory chapter on 
theory, which in this case anchors the 
subject in the discipline of security 
studies and international relations. This 
is followed by a central hypothesis, 
an equally detailed explanation and 
discussion of methodology, and a 
conclusion. Karlin has done her work 
well in this regard; if her dissertation 
committee was not impressed with 
her efforts, it should have been. As her 
evidence and analyses build, nearly 
250 pages later, the reader is likely to 
throw in the intellectual towel and agree 
that an excellent job has been done.
If this were all there was to Building 
Militaries in Fragile States, from the 
position of the lay reader or even the 
security practitioner it would constitute 
a lot of squeeze for a fairly small amount 
of juice. The exceptional attention to 
detail, the comprehensive analysis, and 
the reasoning that are essential to a 
successful dissertation do not always 
make for the most-entertaining reading. 
Thankfully, there is more to this book.
For example, the case studies are 
interesting in and of themselves. 
Accounts of the efforts made to keep 
Greece in the Western sphere of influ-
ence following World War II make for 
fascinating reading. The fact that this 
story is not part of common knowledge 
makes Karlin’s presentation all the 
more interesting. Although the level of 
American and allied effort involved may 
seem small—even quaint—in the cur-
rent environment, the strategic conse-
quences reverberate to the current day.
The case of Vietnam makes for equally 
compelling reading—and Karlin’s 
analysis reveals that America’s failure in 
its attempts to build the South Vietnam-
ese army was even more spectacular 
than commonly is acknowledged. 
Given the enormous sacrifice that 
South Vietnamese soldiers made, the 
price of failure was exceptionally high. 
Karlin’s work, at least by implication, 
adds to the ethical questions pertaining 
to the implementation of U.S. strate-
gies. She is not afraid to name names, 
identifying Lieutenant General Samuel 
T. “Hanging Sam” Williams as one of 
the principal architects of failure.
The final two case studies both involve 
Lebanon. The first examines U.S. 
efforts to strengthen the Lebanese 
national army in the early 1980s; the 
second looks at similar efforts under-
taken approximately twenty years later. 
Although it can be debated whether 
the lack of success in creating a strong 
Lebanese national army was the single 
most critical failure of U.S. policy and 
strategy, Karlin leaves no doubt that 
her hypothesis accounts for the failure 
of that portion of the U.S. effort.
In her first chapter, Karlin identifies 
many cases that do not fit within her 
construct. On page 1 she identifies the 
effort to strengthen other militaries as 
predominantly a post–World War II 
phenomenon. However, the historical 
record suggests that similar efforts were 
made much earlier, in places such as 
Haiti, Nicaragua, and the prewar Philip-
pines. She also, for reasons that are 
obvious, does not include more-recent 
cases, such as that of Mali, that may 
lack accessible, nonclassified research 
material to perform proper analysis, 
or where conditions on the ground are 
simply too dangerous to allow research, 
as in Yemen. This observation neither 
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negates nor even seriously calls into 
question Dr. Karlin’s conclusion, but it 
does suggest that additional opportuni-
ties to test her hypothesis are available.
However, it is in the concluding chapter 
of her work, “Findings and Implica-
tions,” that Dr. Karlin best engages those 
readers concerned with the current state 
of the U.S. national-security enterprise. 
In these pages, her role as scholar shares 
ground with, or even gives way to, her 
experience as a practitioner. Her voice 
becomes more distinct and personal. 
Her questions and recommendations 
for current and future strategists and 
implementers of policy are pertinent 
and sharp edged—as they should be. 
One hopes that this chapter points 
toward Karlin’s intentions regarding 
future writings and research, and if 
these future works include more of 
her personal experiences, backed 
with her academic bona fides, they 
promise to be of immense interest.
RICHARD NORTON
Empire of the Winds: The Global Role of Asia’s 
Great Archipelago, by Philip Bowring. New York: 
I. B. Tauris, 2018. 336 pages. $31.50.
At a recent conference, I overheard 
several participants discussing 
the best terminology for maritime 
Southeast Asia. While South China 
Sea is partly applicable, this term not 
only fails to include the entirety of 
the region (particularly the Indonesia 
archipelago) but also provides titular 
deference to disputed Chinese claims 
in the region. In his book Empire of 
the Winds Philip Bowring solves this 
quandary by resurrecting an ancient 
term to define the region: Nusantaria.
Bowring, a journalist with over forty 
years of experience in Southeast Asia, 
makes a convincing case for Nusantar- 
ia as a coherent historical entity. He 
includes therein the modern-day 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam, and impressively stretches his 
argument back fifteen thousand years. 
Evidence from the fields of linguistics, 
genetics, archaeology, and anthropol-
ogy works together to form an image 
of a vibrant web of maritime culture 
and commerce. Bowring certainly 
acknowledges the impact of India and 
China on the early history of the region, 
as well as the later impact of Europe, but 
remains anchored throughout the text to 
Nusantaria. This is especially refreshing 
in his treatments of the spread of Islam 
and Christianity to the region, and the 
more recent spread of nationalism. In 
each case, he appropriately traces the 
origins of these ideologies to external 
forces, all the while remaining focused 
on their integration and syncretization 
into Nusantarian culture and society.
Not only does Bowring convincingly 
argue for the existence of Nusantaria 
as a region or geographical category of 
analysis; he also convincingly argues 
that for the majority of the past it 
was Nusantaria—not China—that 
dominated the region. China is not 
ignored but rather is relegated to being 
a marginal actor—which is a welcome 
and powerful orientation. An example 
of this is chapter 9, which tells the 
story of Champa from a Nusantarian, 
sea-facing perspective, rather than 
emphasizing the Vietnamese and 
Chinese overland connection. Bowring 
makes this theme explicit: “Today, the 
history of the Cham, and before that 
of Sa Huynh, and their presence in 
the Spratly Islands provides historical 
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